# ECP5 fabric safety-policy disarm record — 2026-08-29

## Result and scope

Company-authored physical-board engineering evidence: the board image now
routes CPU CFS writes to a fabric safety-policy engine rather than directly to
permit. The policy requires the dedicated SW5-1 physical arm condition and is
designed to allow one non-renewable 40 ms permit interval before fabric lockout.

With SW5-1 open, deliberately arbitrary machine-mode firmware issued a direct
CFS request. Retained UART reported:

```
initial=4
machine_direct_request=4
pass=physical_disarm_blocks_direct_request
```

The image was loaded through JTAG into volatile SRAM only and used only the
onboard LEDs, UART and SW5-1. Configuration flash, expansion pins, product
I/O and actuators were not touched.

## Scope

Scope: the disarmed path of the fabric policy, in volatile SRAM on the ECP5 evaluation board. The armed one-shot lockout is in `ecp5-fabric-safety-policy-lockout-2026-08-29.md`.

## Reproducibility

The completed internal record is
`evidence/runs/2026-08-29-ecp5-fabric-safety-policy-negative-001/manifest.json`.
It retains frozen inputs, bitstream, build and loader logs, raw UART capture,
tool versions and hashes.